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ABSTRACT 
“Private Military Companies: Analyzing the Use of Armed Contractors” explores 
the critical issues that influence the decision to utilize private military companies (PMC) 
and armed contractors in support of U.S. military operations.  The critical issues 
identified in the thesis address a combination of government, military, and public 
concerns with the private military industry.  Understanding of these critical issues will 
assist policy makers in determining the validity of the PMC concept and extent to which 
the U.S. government could utilize armed contractors and consider privatization of combat 
forces as a viable option to satisfy certain military requirements of this nation.  The thesis 
also expands on the link between the expansion in the private military industry and the 
shortage of U.S. government resources to satisfy the requirements of its foreign policy 
decisions.  This work focused on the legitimate use of PMCs and armed contractors to 
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The Private military industry is now a reality.  Its emergence raises 
possibilities and dilemmas that are not only compelling and fascinating in 
a theoretical sense, but also driven by their real world relevance. – Peter 
W. Singer, 2004 1 
Outsourcing of military-related security, training, and logistics functions has been 
the direct result of the downsizing of military capabilities after the end of the Cold War 
and the recent increase of foreign policy commitments.  More than a decade after the 
Cold War, the military is now stretched to its limits with multiple large-scale 
deployments and numerous low-intensity conflicts worldwide.  The demands on the 
military to support these operations continue to grow.2  In an effort to reduce some of 
these demands on our military, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Department 
of State (DoS) have turned to the private sector as part of an overall trend in the 
privatization of certain military functions.3 
The most recent requirements come from the multiple large-scale military 
operations in the Middle East as part of the Global War on Terror.  In order to respond to 
policy changes, the government needed to find additional resources to conduct these 
operations, specifically in Iraq.4  The options of expanding the military or obligating 
large portions of the National Guard and Reserves to active duty were not politically 
feasible or desirable.  So the government turned to the private sector and private military 
companies (PMCs) to reduce the demands on the military. 
                                                 
1 Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), 242. 
2 Defense Science Board Task Force, Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in 
the Global War on Terrorism, September 2007 [report online]; available from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports.htm; Internet; accessed 22 November 2007. 
3 Jennifer Elsea and Nina Serafino, “Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, 
and Other Issues,” CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 21 June 2007), 1-6. 
4 Steve, Fainaru, “Iraq Contractors Face Growing Parallel War” Washington Post Foreign Service, 16 
June 2007 [news article online]; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061502602.html; Internet; accessed 15 August 2007.  
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This expanded use of PMCs by the government has developed into a reliance on 
the private military industry (PMI) to support U.S. military operations.  The DoD and 
DoS now consider PMCs an integral component of the total force.  In January 2007, 
during an appearance before the Senate Arms Service Committee, the top commander in 
Iraq, U.S. Army General David H. Petraeus, said that “he counts the thousands of 
contract security forces among the assets available to him to supplement the limited 
number of U.S. and Iraqi troops to be used for dealing with the insurgency.”5  The 
number of contractors has steadily increased to the current state of about 180,000 
(estimated) contractors working in Iraq, of which about 48,000 are armed contractors 
providing security services.6  In total, these contracted personnel exceed the total number 
of U.S. military ground forces operating in Iraq, as of December 2007.  Currently, the 
roles of contracted personnel are limited to security and support roles only, and exclude 
direct action or offensive use.  In the near future, if policy requirements continue to 
exceed available resources, the government may be forced to expand the use of PMCs 
and armed contractors. 
Yet to be determined is how the U.S. government’s use and reliance on PMCs 
will unfold in a democratic society.  The decision to use PMCs and armed contractors has 
placed the U.S. government in a vulnerable position.  The government is committed to its 
foreign policy and the use of PMCs to support this policy; the government needs to 
ensure success of privatization.  If support for the PMC concept dwindles, then, 
realistically, the government may be forced to change its policy on key issues, such as 
reinstituting a draft or limiting its foreign interventions.   
A. PURPOSE  
“Private Military Companies: Analyzing the Use of Armed Contractors” explores 
the legitimate use of PMCs and armed contractors to support U.S. government and 
                                                 
5 Walter Pincus, “Security Contracts to Continue in Iraq: New Top Commander Counts Hired Guards 
Among his Assets,” Washington Post, 4 February 2007 [newspaper online]; available from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/03/AR2007020301372.html; Internet; 
accessed 10 February 2007. 
6 Peter Singer, “Counterproductive: Private Military Contractors Harm the Counterinsurgency effort in 
Iraq.” Armed Forces Journal (November 2007), 36-39.  
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military operations.  Its primary objective is to identify and analyze the critical issues 
involved in the use of armed contractors and to examine the expanded roles PMCs might 
play in the execution and implementation of national and defense policies.  A case study 
of Blackwater Security Consulting – a widely known, American owned and based PMC 
that provides the service of armed contractors – informs the discussion.  The Blackwater 
case study was chosen because Blackwater epitomizes the PMI and follows the 
previously identified trends of expansion and growth.   
There has been a steady increase in the number of contractors supporting U.S. 
military operations and remarkable expansion of the PMI over the past decade.7  As 
referenced in Chapter III, the total number of contractors in Iraq has steadily increased to 
almost 180,000, as of November 2007, supporting U.S. military operations.8  From 
Bosnia to Iraq, outsourcing is gaining traction, and the U.S. government has developed a 
dependence on its services.9  This dependence by the U.S. government is supported by 
the contractor-to-soldier ratio.  During the first Gulf War, the ratio was approximately 
one contractor to every 50 military personnel.  Currently in Iraq, it appears that the ratio 
is approaching one contractor for every soldier.10 
Although the PMC concept has demonstrated its merit in these engagements, its 
expansion may be limited as a consequence of the issues of accountability that have 
surfaced in the Blackwater case.11  It is anyone’s guess as to the outcome of the events in 
Iraq on September 16, 2007, when 17 Iraqi civilians were shot by Blackwater employees. 
                                                 
7 David Isenberg, “A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military 
Companies in Iraq,” Research Report 2004.4 (British American Security Information Council, September 
2004), 7, 19. 
8 Peter Singer, “Counterproductive: Private Military Contractors Harm the Counterinsurgency effort in 
Iraq,” Armed Forces Journal (November 2007): 37. 
9 Marc Lindemann, “Civilian Contractors under Military Law,” Parameters (Autumn 2007): 83-94. 
10 Isenberg, 7. 
11 Two sources were used:  Jennifer Elsea and Nina Serafino, “Private Security Contractors in Iraq: 
Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues,” CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 
21 June 2007); and John Broder and James Risen, “Armed Guards in Iraq Occupy a Legal Limbo,” The 
New York Times, 20 September 2007 [newspaper online]; available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/20/world/middleeast/20blackwater.html?_r=1&ei=5087%0A&em=&en=
2101831599e1231f&ex=1190433600&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print; Internet; accessed 24 September 
2007. 
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The U.S. government extensively uses and relies on Blackwater contractors in military 
operations, but they are now being viewed by some experts and senior military officials 
as counterproductive to the efforts of the U.S. government and military.12  Thus, it is 
incumbent on the government to address the concerns surrounding the industry and the 
PMCs, especially issues concerning regulation and oversight.  This may be the opportune 
time for reform.   
B. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis examines only those issues involved with PMCs, contracted by the 
U.S. government, to provide armed support of U.S. military operations and will not 
address the following issues: 
• Operational command and control mechanisms for contractors. 
• PMCs hired to support other than overt operations. 
• PMCs working for outside clients other than the U.S. government (states, 
governments, or other movements). 
This work is bound by a set of assumptions that affect the extent to which the U.S. 
government will continue the utilization of PMCs and the policy decisions that influence 
their use: 
• U.S. military maintains current uniformed force structure with no rapid 
increase in numbers. 
• For the foreseeable future, U.S. foreign policy requirements will continue 
to exceed the resources of the U.S. government, and by extension, the 
military. 
• The U.S. government continues the trend of privatization to fulfill its 
requirements; the DoD and DoS utilize PMCs in military operations. 
                                                 
12 Jonathan Finer, “Security Contractors in Iraq Under Scrutiny After Shootings,” Washington Post 
Foreign Service, 10 September 2007 [newspaper online]; available from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/09/AR2005090902136_pf.html; Internet; 
accessed 10 February 2007. 
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• DoD and DoS acknowledge and accept PMCs as part of their overall force 
structure (Bosnia, Kosovo, OEF-Afghanistan, and OIF-Iraq). 
C.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To what extent has the government considered privatization as a viable option to 
satisfy the force requirements of U.S. sanctioned irregular warfare operations and low 
intensity conflicts?  In order to properly address this thesis question, a set of additional 
research questions investigate the recent trends in privatization and the use of armed 
contractors in support of U.S. military operations: 
• Why has the PMI expanded? 
• What is the role of PMCs in support of DoD and DoS operations? 
• What are the critical issues that affect the use of armed contractors? 
• What are the expanded roles that PMCs could perform in U.S. military 
operations in the future? 
• What are the recommendations for reform in the use of PMCs? 
D. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS  
Contractor:  Definition from AR 715-9:  A U.S. citizen employed by a private 
military company that has been contracted by the U.S. government to support or augment 
government agencies in operations ― other than war and wartime operations.13  
DoD:  Refers to the United States Department of Defense and those functions and 
operations associated with this government agency. 
DoS:  Refers to the United States Department of State and those functions and 
operations associated with this government agency. 
Inherently governmental functions:  Definition from AR 715-9:  Those 
functions necessary to sustain combat operations, that are performed under combat 
                                                 
13 Army Regulation 715-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force (Washington DC: Department of the 
Army, 29 October 1999), 4. 
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conditions, and that require direct control by the military command structure and military 
training for their proper execution.  This includes functions performed exclusively by 
military (active and reserve) who are trained for combat and the use of deadly force, 
where performance by a contractor or civilian would violate their non-combatant status 
under the Geneva Conventions or represent an inappropriate risk to military operations.14 
Mercenary:  The following definition is from Article 47 of Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions (1977).15 
A mercenary is any person who: 
1.   Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 
conflict; 
2. Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
3. Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for 
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the 
conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or 
paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of 
that Party; 
4. Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
5. Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
6. Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official 
duty as a member of its armed forces. 
As stated in the CRS Report for Congress:  
Under this definition, it appears that contracted personnel who are not U.S. 
nationals, the nationals of other coalition allies or Iraqi nationals, and who 
were hired to — and in fact do — take part in hostilities might be considered 
                                                 
14 Army Regulation 715-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force (Washington DC: Department of the 
Army, 29 October 1999), 21. 
15 Jennifer Elsea and Nina Serafino, “Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, 
and Other Issues,” CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 21 June 2007), 14. 
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to be mercenaries, assuming the definition in Protocol I applies as 
customary international law in the context of the current hostilities in Iraq.16 
PMC:  Refers to private military companies that operate under the larger 
umbrella of the PMI.  A PMC is a privately owned entity that is contracted by the 
government to provide military-type services in support of U.S. government and military 
operations.  Included in this term are the organizational and administrative systems of the 
company that support its operational government and military contractors. 
PMI:  Refers to the private military industry as a whole, inclusive of all the PMCs 
that support U.S. government and its military operations. 
E. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
1. Chapter II: Expansion of the Private Military Industry 
Chapter II outlines the historical and legal precedent of privatization in the 
development of the state.  The collapse of the former Soviet Union led to several key 
events that fueled the re-emergence of the PMI in the modern era.  In the years following 
the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy decisions would not only expand the PMI, but also the 
degree to which the U.S. government relies on the services of PMCs and armed 
contractors. 
The PMI’s increasing role in national security and military operations is not likely 
to recede in the foreseeable future.  The resources that the U.S. government can bring to 
bear, and specifically the DoD and DoS, are not adequate for the growing number of 
requirements as a result of foreign policy decisions. 
The final section focuses on the actions of Executive Outcomes in South Africa.  
Executive Outcomes was one of the first PMCs in the modern era after the Cold War, and 
its success, and set the example for PMCs.  Other PMCs would emerge in its shadow and 
come to emulate the model set forth by Executive Outcomes. 
                                                 
16 Jennifer Elsea and Nina Serafino, “Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, 
and Other Issues,” CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 21 June 2007), 14. 
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2. Chapter III: Current Snapshot of Private Military Companies 
Chapter III provides a current snapshot of the PMI by taking a closer look at the 
roles and trends in contracting PMCs.  PMCs fall into one of three categories: military 
provider firms, support firms, and consultant firms.  The numbers of PMCs and 
contractors supporting U.S. military operations clearly illustrate the trends and reliance 
by the U.S. government on PMCs.  In addition, this section covers the current legal 
framework that governs the actions of contractors operating in Iraq. 
3. Chapter IV: Blackwater Case Study 
Chapter IV presents a case study on Blackwater USA that serves to highlight the 
difficulties and challenges of the PMI and provides an example of the privatization trend 
that has accelerated since the end of the Cold War.  Blackwater is the name that is today 
synonymous with the modern PMC, and represents the good, the bad, and the ugly of the 
PMI. 
4. Chapter V: Critical Issues of the Private Military Industry 
Chapter V explores the critical issues that influence the decision by policy makers 
to utilize PMCs and armed contractors in support of U.S. military operations.  The critical 
issues outlined in this chapter address a combination of government, military, and public 
concerns with the PMI.  These are the issues that need to be overcome before the U.S. 
government can consider the use of PMCs and armed contractors as a viable option in 
U.S. military operations. 
5. Chapter VI: Building Frameworks for Private Military Companies 
Chapter VI discusses the legal and contractual frameworks that are needed to 
effectively integrate PMCs in U.S. military operations.  PMCs are ready and willing to 
take on expanded roles, but decision makers need to carefully consider the issues that 
affect proper implementation of the PMC concept.  The expanded roles that PMCs and 
armed contractors could perform are widespread and only limited by the authority given  
 
 9
to them by the U.S. government.  As outlined in this chapter, revised frameworks are 
necessary before the U.S. government can consider the use of PMCs as a viable option to 
support U.S. military operations. 
6. Chapter VII: Conclusion 
Chapter VII is an overview of the work presented in this thesis. 
 10
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II. EXPANSION OF THE PRIVATE MILITARY INDUSTRY 
PMCs have come a long way.  Where as little as a decade ago they were 
limited to African war zones they have now assumed a leading role in the 
activities of the world’s sole military superpower, as well as being a front 
and center actor in the daily life of Iraq. – David Isenberg, 2004 17 
With the U.S. government’s increased reliance on armed contractors, the 
privatized security market has grown exponentially.  As Peter Singer, a National Security 
Fellow at the Brookings Institute and renowned expert on the PMI wrote in 2003, the 
“privatized military industry is still in its relative infancy, but it appears that the true 
boom lies shortly ahead.”18  The customers for this industry at the present time are 
mainly nation-states; governments hire PMCs to supply a range of services from logistics 
to intelligence and armed security.  The expansion of the PMI has generated both praise 
and criticism and has engendered new questions relating to national security.  However, 
one trend seems clear: growth in the PMI is expected to continue.  According to Peter 
Singer, “the evidence so far indicates that the industry will grow in size, scope, activity 
and resultant influence within the international security sphere.”19  
A. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT 
Since the beginning of recorded history, the private sector has been involved in 
war and the provision of war.20  As warfare became more complex, specialization 
occurred in the manufacture of weapons, development of new tactics and procedures, and 
the financial aspects of waging war.21  This specialization was not, and never was fully, 
                                                 
17 David Isenberg, “A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military 
Companies in Iraq,” Research Report 2004.4 (British American Security Information Council, September 
2004), 7. 
18 Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), 79. 
19 Ibid., 190. 
20 Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 31, 158, 249, 330, 334. 
21 Robert O’Connell, The Soul of the Sword: An Illustrated History of Weaponry and Warfare from 
Prehistory to the Present (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002). 
 12
the exclusive domain of the government.  Indeed, the monopolization of violence by the 
state appears to be but an anomaly in the continuum of history.  This anomaly has 
become accepted as the status quo in the modern age, and many analysts have perceived 
expansion of the PMI as eroding the modern state’s monopoly on the use of force.22  
However, looking through the historical lens, it is perhaps more accurate to say that the 
private sector is only reclaiming functions that were relinquished to the state. 
If the history of privatization is viewed in the form of a pendulum, then the re-
emergence of privatization in military affairs is only a natural rebalancing of a sector that 
had swung towards the public domain.  As the nation-state system expanded after 1648, 
the state took over many aspects of national life that were formerly controlled by the 
private sector.  This trend appears to have reached its apex by World War II; states had 
extended public power into every aspect of private life, and included industry, health, 
formerly independent media, and even religion.23  For example, the quintessential nation-
state was the Nazi government of Germany.  As stated by Minister of Propaganda Joseph 
Goebbels, “the only time the individual was free of state control was in his dreams.”24  
The same phenomena also occurred in Stalin’s Soviet Union.  Under communism, the 
state controlled every aspect of life.  It was the apotheosis of the complete victory by the 
public sector, in the form of the nation-state, over every aspect of the private sector.25  
The long march from Westphalia in 1648 had finally been accomplished. 
It was soon realized, however, that the public sector was not ideally suited to 
handle all aspects of public and private life, at least in the democratic societies of the 
West and specifically in the United States.  After World War II, sentiment began to shift 
towards decentralization.  It was a gradual shift that first began in intellectual circles 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s.  The United States had also become very  
                                                 
22 Jennifer Elsea and Nina Serafino, “Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, 
and Other Issues,” CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 21 June 2007), 27. 
23 Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 156, 189-262. 
24 Ibid., 204. 
25 Ibid., 258-262, 372. 
 13
centralized, though not to the degree of European nation-states.  New bureaucracies were 
created, and a social system that placed control and responsibility for decisions on the 
state was expanded.26 
In the post-war era from 1945 to 1975, the bureaucracy of the government in the 
United States continued to expand.  It was not until the end of this period that the 
pendulum appeared to have begun its shift back towards the private sector.27  Citizens 
began to realize that government bureaucracy was inherently inefficient and could not 
provide services as well as the private sector.28  People were motivated primarily by their 
own self-interest and not by altruism.  Only by aligning individual motivations with 
public (state) interests would better results be achieved.  These intellectual arguments 
were reinforced by the economic arguments of Milton Friedman, who expounded on the 
virtues of free markets and limited government intervention in the economic life of the 
nation.29  The nation-state and public sector control had reached the apex and began its 
long retreat from sectors of the economy that had formerly been controlled by the private 
sector.   
Therefore, the rise and expansion of the PMI over the past 20 years has marked 
the decline of the state’s monopoly on the use of force.  This decline is the result of 
downsized government agencies and the privatization of those military functions once 
monopolized by the state.  It could be strongly argued that PMCs that have risen up to fill 
a demand are only reclaiming a sector that was, until the turn of the century, largely in 
the private domain.   
B. LEGAL PRECEDENT 
There is considerable legal precedent to support the private control of force and 
the existence of private military entities throughout history.  It can be further argued that 
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the private control of force, and hence the PMI in the modern era, is a natural 
phenomenon that results from the very nature of man himself.  Opponents of the private 
control of military force frequently cite Thomas Hobbes and argue that the state should 
have a monopoly on force.30  This school of thought further argues that it is immoral and 
unethical for private, non-state actors to control force or engage in military functions.  
From a historical and intellectual perspective, this is a direct contradiction of the 
principles upon which the United States was founded. 
The founding fathers of the United States recognized that the state should not 
have a monopoly on force.  With their recent experience in fighting the British crown, 
they fully believed that government, left to its own devices, would eventually become 
overbearing in its use of force, and would resort to force and violence to keep its citizenry 
in check.  Therefore, they wrote checks and balances into the U.S. Constitution that 
limited the amount of force that the government could bring to bear on its citizens.  The 
realization and subsequent codification of the idea that the government does not have a 
monopoly on force is found in the Bill of Rights, and specifically, the Second 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  It is well established in U.S. legal precedent that 
the government does not hold a monopoly on force and the management of violence.  
Most importantly, Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, grants the right of 
the PMI to exist.  This section establishes and acknowledges that the PMI plays an 
important role in defense of this nation, so important that it should not be left solely to the 
government to execute.  This section of the constitution also acknowledges that the 
government is not always going to be able to provide military services in a timely manner 
and the private sector can and will play an important role in the building of the nation. 
The expansion of the United States in the nineteenth century is a history of private 
military actions undertaken on behalf and with the full support of the government.  Both 
private naval and land forces were used in the defense of national interests.  During the 
War of 1812, the U.S. government authorized privateers to prey on enemy shipping.31  It 
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should not be assumed that the government has always controlled the use of force.  Nor 
should it be assumed that the government is the best organization to manage the use of 
force.  Most certainly, the government will always retain the authority to do so, but may 
not always possess the means or even the expertise to be able to do so in an efficient and 
effective manner.   
C. POST COLD WAR EXPANSION 
This section will discuss the modern era and the expansion of the PMI beginning 
at the end of the Cold War and continuing to the present day.  It will attempt to explain 
the re-emergence and exponential growth of the PMI in the 1990s in view of the 
structural and policy deficiencies that created the opportunities for these individuals and 
companies. 
The expansion of the PMI in the modern era can be attributed to a number of 
factors and events.  However, the most important of these was the downsizing of the 
large militaries that faced off against each other for nearly 45 years in the superpower 
showdown known as the Cold War.  In the United States, downsizing the military, which 
began in 1990 and continued throughout the 1990s, was perceived as the rational course 
of action after the collapse of the former Soviet Union.32 
While civilian global labor markets absorbed the majority of former soldiers, 
some decided to market their military skill sets in the areas of private security and global 
risk management.  As members of the great capitalistic system, those early visionaries in 
the PMI foresaw an increasingly chaotic third world, with large numbers of failed or 
failing states, and seized an opportunity to capitalize on this turmoil by offering security 
services to governments and private corporations.  As discussed in the next section, 
Executive Outcomes in South Africa provides an example of a PMC formed in response 
to the demand for privatized military forces.  These individuals and corporations that 
seized this market were not encroaching upon domains that the government controlled 
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exclusively.  Rather, they were filling a need or requirement, a vacuum created by the 
retreat of the state from the security domain.  According to Thomas Adams, the 
“successful track record of companies like Executive Outcomes” makes PMCs a 
“realistic option” for governments in need of additional military resources.33 
After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. military, specifically the 
Army, was restructured to meet the challenges of a changing strategic environment.34  
The order to restructure and transform the military was given by President George H. W. 
Bush in August 1990.  President Bush called on the DoD to develop a defense strategy 
for the future that would adapt to the new global environment.35  As stated by Paul 
Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,  
A new defense strategy was mandated because of three key interlocking 
developments:  (1) the transformation of the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe; (2) changes in the nature of regional conflicts; and (3) the 
evolution of increasingly capable American friends and allies.  These 
developments are major successes for the United States, but they also 
present new challenges.36 
In the period after the Gulf War in 1991, the shift in strategy was maintained 
throughout President Clinton’s terms in office, initially under the direction of then-
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin.  The military was downsized and restructured, becoming 
more agile to address smaller regional conflicts that were predicted to arise.  The premise 
for this decision was that the large standing army of the Cold War period was not 
appropriate for the new global environment and was no longer required to face off against 
the Soviet Union.37  The military downsized significantly, restructured, and adopted the 
new strategy for the future. 
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During the 1990s, the U.S. military continued the transformation process as a 
result of these actions and world events.  From 1990 to 1998, the U.S. Army went from 
roughly 785,000 to less than 500,000 active duty soldiers.38  Additionally, the Reserve 
and National Guard forces were realigned to fill surge requirements and force gaps in the 
active component.39 
Policy makers must have thought that restructuring the military in this manner 
was the right thing to do given the new global environment and security posture.  But, as 
time has proven, this restructure of the military in the 1990s, and recent foreign policy 
decisions to engage in multiple large scale operations, have stretched our military to its 
operational limits.  The policy requirements exceed the resources and PMCs were 
contracted to fill the gaps.40 
Unquestionably, restructuring and downsizing of the military in the mid 1990s set 
the conditions for growth in the PMI.  By the late 1990s and early 2000s, foreign policy 
decisions had not only created the market for privatized military forces, but established 
the U.S. government’s dependence on PMCs to support military operations.41  PMCs 
were contracted in large numbers to support and fill gaps in the force structure.  Policy 
decisions placed increasing demands on government agencies, which led to continued 
utilization and acceptance of PMCs as a critical component of the U.S. military. 
Reliance by the government on PMCs and contractors fueled the expansion and 
growth of PMCs.  The PMI has matured over the past two decades; expansion and 
operational successes have reinforced the viability of the PMC concept.  As Singer states, 
“The Private military industry is now a reality.  Its emergence raises possibilities and 
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dilemmas that are not only compelling and fascinating in a theoretical sense, but  
also driven by their real world relevance.”42 
D. EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES: USHERING IN THE MODERN ERA 
One of the major unintended consequences of the end of the Cold War in 1989 
was the reduction in security assistance afforded to third world nations.  These nations, 
without the benefits of being a proxy fighter sponsored by a superpower actor, began to 
fail at a rate that accelerated markedly in the mid-1990s.  By 1995, many of these nations, 
mainly on the continent of Africa, faced armed conflict.43  The security vacuum created 
by these failing states resulted in the emergence of several PMCs.  The most prominent of 
these organizations was Executive Outcomes in South Africa. 
The origin of the PMI in the modern era can be traced to the formation of the firm 
Executive Outcomes in 1989.44  Executive Outcomes was formed by an ex-South African 
Defense Forces officer by the name of Eban Barlow and first rose to prominence during 
the Angolan Civil War in 1993.  The Angolan government, led by MPLA president, Jose 
Eduardo dos Santos, was on the verge of defeat at the hands of UNITA rebels led by 
Jonas Savimbi.45  It hired Executive Outcomes to turn the situation around.   
Executive Outcomes, under a two month short term contract and utilizing a 
contracted military force fewer than 200 personnel, was able to quickly achieve success 
by recapturing Angolan oil facilities at Kefekwena and Soyo.46  Dos Santos, after seeing 
the utility of using contracted private forces, offered Executive Outcomes a one year 
renewable contract to support the Angolan Army worth over $40 million a year.47   
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During the course of this contract, Executive Outcomes trained the Angolan 
Army’s 16th Brigade and inserted itself into the command structure.48  They also 
provided advisors to the high command of the Angolan Army in order to instill a strategic 
direction and to help steer operations.  As a result of these efforts, the reinvigorated 
Angolan Army was able to force Savimbi’s UNITA rebels to the negotiating table 
through a series of stunning victories.  In November of 1994, Savimbi agreed to sign the 
U.N.-brokered Lusaka Peace Accord.49  By 1996, Executive Outcomes had earned 
roughly $80 million from its contract and had been directly responsible for bringing 
peace to the war-torn country of Angola.50    
Executive Outcomes earned a reputation for military professionalism from its two 
and a half years in Angola and was credited with bringing that country’s bloody civil war 
to a close.  The publicity that Executive Outcomes received did not seem to sit well with 
the international community, who viewed the company’s mercenary-type activities with 
suspicion and mistrust.  Perhaps jealousy would be the more appropriate term, as a U.N. 
peacekeeping force of thousands was a catastrophic failure and cost $1 million a day to 
maintain.51  Many viewed the company’s success in Angola as a fluke, a lucky gambit 
that turned out to be successful but that was unlikely to be repeated.  Events would prove 
otherwise, in April 1995, Executive Outcomes would sign a contract with Sierra Leone to 
provide military support and training to the Sierra Leonean Army.52 
The Executive Outcomes experience in Sierra Leone would prove to be the 
highpoint of its success and an example of the utility to be found in contracting PMCs in 
the modern era.  Similar to Angola, a force of less than 300 personnel was able to defeat a 
rebel force on behalf of a legitimate government.  It was also able to rescue thousands of 
child soldiers from slavery as well as avert major atrocities and genocides from 
occurring.  The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was defeated on the battlefield and 
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quickly forced to the negotiating table.  However, a condition of the peace agreement was 
that Executive Outcomes had to leave the country.  Facing international pressure, the 
company withdrew in 1997 and left behind a country in which they had ended the war 
and brought free elections.53  Unfortunately, just four months later, a coup destroyed the 
progress that had been made and Sierra Leone returned to a state of chaos. 
Executive Outcomes is an early example of growth and success in the privatized 
military and international security domains; other PMCs would follow their lead in the 
decades to come.  According to Peter Singer, this trend is part of the maturing of the PMI 
in the 1990s and is expected to continue into the foreseeable future.54  It is important to 
note that these companies are rising to fill the security vacuum left by failed and failing 
states.  If looked at from the perspective of a market, there is simply a rising demand and 
need for military services that were not being provided by traditional nation-states and 
other international bodies.   
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III. CURRENT SNAPSHOT OF PRIVATE MILITARY 
COMPANIES 
Contractors are fast, reliable, skilled, efficient, and largely anonymous.  It 
is no stretch to call the contractors of the United States a “shadow army.”  
They come from every branch of the military, government, business, 
industry, and academia.  Although their employment is temporary, given 
the United States’ inclination to influence world events, it is unlikely that 
there will be any shortage of employment opportunities in the foreseeable 
future. – Colonel Gerald Schumacher (ret.), 2006 55 
A. TYPOLOGY OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 
There are several different frameworks that have been proposed in order to frame 
the PMI.  Some have attempted to group these private military firms according to their 
level of activity and whether that activity can be classified as active or passive.56  Others 
have looked at the industry from a political science perspective, attempting to group firms 
as primarily international or domestic.  Yet others have attempted to measure offensive 
and defensive capabilities and have sought to group organizations according to this 
methodology.57  However, the best typology, according to Peter Singer, appears to be the 
division of PMCs into three types of firms: military provider firms, military consultant 
firms, and military support firms.58  Each of these firms is distinguished by the range of 
services that it provides and the level of force involved, if any.  
1. Military Provider Firms 
Military provider firms, such as Blackwater Security Consulting, are the most 
widely known and controversial.  These firms provide security type services to U.S. 
government agencies and operate in combat zones alongside uniformed military forces.  
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Primarily, the firms provide security services to the DoD and DoS; typical tasks include 
diplomatic and convoy armed security.  Provider firms capable of providing combat 
services are highly specialized and constitute a small portion of the private sector 
supporting U.S. military operations.  Executive Outcomes in South Africa was one of the 
first PMCs to provide these types of services to legitimate governments.59 
2. Military Support Firms 
Military support firms like Halliburton or Kellogg, Brown, and Root are the 
largest of the private firms that Singer outlines.  Support firms provide an extensive list of 
logistical support services that basically keep U.S. military operations running.  These 
firms provide non-lethal services to the U.S. government and military that range from 
operating dining facilities to driving convoys that keep the military supplied with critical 
material.60 
3. Military Consultant Firms 
Military consultant firms are the smallest of the group that Singer outlines.  
Consultant firms are highly technical and their services are more focused on providing 
military and technical support functions.  They are contracted to provide technical 
support on weapon, vehicle, and aircraft systems.  Their functions range from 
maintenance and training to technical support on the battlefield.61 
B. TRENDS IN CONTRACTING 
Current trends in contracting PMCs by the U.S. government, in support of 
military operations, can best be identified through an analysis of the number of 
contractors employed under current PMC contracts, specifically in Iraq.  The actual 
numbers of personnel, contracted by the U.S. government in Iraq at the present time, are 
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unknown due to ambiguity in the PMI, but according to a DoD census in 2007, the total 
number of contractors operating in Iraq is now more than 180,000.62  This number is 
purely an estimate (due to the cloud of secrecy that surrounds PMCs and the transparency 
issues that preclude the ability for open sources to obtain actual numbers) and roughly 
includes “21,000 Americans, 43,000 foreign contractors, and over 100,000 Iraqi 
civilians.”63  As of November 2007, the total number of contractors – all employed by 
U.S. tax dollars – operating in Iraq now appear to equal or exceed the numbers of actual 
U.S. military forces.64  These numbers clearly illustrate the degree to which PMCs are 
supporting U.S. military operations and how the U.S. government is relying on them to 
fill gaps in the force. 
Of the total number operating in Iraq, armed contractors such as Blackwater, 
constitute less than 30 percent of the 180,000 total contractors with just over 48,000 
serving in this capacity.65  Once again, the mix of American, foreign, and Iraqi also 
factors into this figure with an approximation of about 17 percent being American.66  Of 
the estimated 181 firms providing armed security services, not all are owned and based in 
the United States; Blackwater is the exception.67 
C. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONTRACTORS 
The legal framework for contractors has not adapted as quickly as the PMI has 
expanded.  PMCs operating in support of U.S. military operations are not above the law, 
but international and U.S. military and public law have not been properly applied because 
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PMCs fall into a grey area within the law.68  Proper regulation for PMCs does not exist, 
nor has their position in military affairs truly been defined.69  International law falls short 
by relying on outdated definitions (reference Legitimacy section of Chapter V).  In turn, 
the international community relies on the U.S. government to regulate the activities of its 
contracted PMCs since these firms are functioning on behalf of the United States.70 
PMCs in Iraq are currently operating under an immunity umbrella that is provided 
by the U.S. government and Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 17.   Under 
this CPA order, all contractors employed by the U.S. government are immune from Iraqi 
law, but expected to respect the law.  It also states that contractors are subject to the laws 
of their “sending states.”71  The CPA order does present some legal challenges since not 
all PMCs and contractors working for the U.S. government are from the United States. 
Under the 2007 Defense Authorization Act, U.S. military law (UCMJ) resides 
over contractors, however the implementation of this act by the DoD remains 
questionable.72  Until the U.S. government addresses these issues, the legal framework 
for PMCs operating in U.S. military operations will remain ambiguous.  A resolution to 
this legal ambiguity appears to be forthcoming.  As referenced in the Blackwater case 
study, an incident on September 16, 2007, where Blackwater employees are accused of 
shooting Iraqi civilians, is under investigation by the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (F.B.I.) and will force this legal issue to the forefront. 
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IV. BLACKWATER CASE STUDY 
For Blackwater, the opportunity of a lifetime would come when U.S. 
forces rolled into Baghdad in March 2003. – Jeremy Scahill, 2007 73 
Blackwater Security Group is the name that is today synonymous with the modern 
PMC.  The publicity that this company has received as a result of its security contracts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan has overshadowed that of any other company.  In effect, Blackwater 
has become the poster child of the industry in the minds of both supporters and critics and 
has come to symbolize, depending on which side of the debate a person falls, what is 
being done right and what is being done wrong in the expanding realm of private security 
contracting. 
What is the background of Blackwater?  How did it get its start?  And how did 
Blackwater gain such notoriety in recent years, growing from a small corporation with 
revenues of less than $1 million a year to become the highest profile private armed 
security provider in the United States?  This case study will attempt to answer those 
questions and to provide a glimpse of the corporation that has come to symbolize the PMI 
in the United States.  It can truly be said that as goes Blackwater, so will go the industry. 
A. THE EARLY DAYS OF BLACKWATER 
Blackwater USA was incorporated in 1997 by Erik Prince and Al Clark.  The 
company was initially envisioned as a “private shooting range and training facility for 
military and law-enforcement personnel.”74  In order to make that vision a reality, Prince 
purchased 6000 acres of land near the Great Dismal Swamp, in Moyock, North Carolina 
and began construction of what would ultimately become Blackwater USA’s 
headquarters and training facility.75 
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The first several years were spent building the company from the ground up.  
According to Jeremy Scahill, author of the book Blackwater, ground was broken on the 
Blackwater compound in June 1997, and in May of 1998, the company was officially 
opened for business.76  Close proximity to several large military installations was a key 
factor in the decision to build the facility in Northern North Carolina.  Blackwater’s 
compound is easily accessible to U.S. Army soldiers at Fort Bragg and the Marines at 
Camp Lejeune in North Carolina and the Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia. 
The market for Blackwater USA’s marksmanship training program was initially 
active duty military personnel, federal employees from other civilian agencies, and local 
law enforcement.  Blackwater’s services ranged from expert weapons training to leasing  
range facilities and hosting training seminars and conventions.  By late 1998, Blackwater 
boasted a nine-thousand-square-foot lodge with conference rooms, classrooms, lounge, 
pro shop, and dining hall.77  Blackwater’s early marketing was mainly through word of 
mouth referrals from within the military and law enforcement communities.  As word 
spread of its modern training facilities and user-friendly atmosphere, business increased 
markedly.  However, it wasn’t until February 1, 2000 that business really took off.  That 
is the date that the company won a Government Services Administration (GSA) 
contract.78 
Placement on the GSA service schedule opened Blackwater USA’s range of 
training services to the entire government marketplace.  Being a GSA-approved vendor is 
significant not because it guarantees contracts, but because it exposes a company to 
potential customers.  The GSA schedule is, in effect, the business yellow pages for the 
U.S. government.  Similar companies offer their services on approved schedules and 
government purchasers choose the one that best suits their mission and budget 
requirements.  Hence, this approval was really an additional marketing venue for  
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Blackwater.  While business increased drastically, revenues were still under $1 million 
for the company.  The critical event that would forever alter the fortunes of the company 
was the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
B. GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: CATALYST FOR GROWTH 
The attacks on September 11, 2001 drastically improved the fortunes of 
Blackwater’s small military training operation and set the stage for dramatic growth in 
not only the company’s operations and revenues, but also in its reputation as the leader in 
its industry.  These attacks, preceded by the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in October of 2000, 
marked a realization by the U.S. Navy that it needed to increasingly concentrate on force 
protection.  As a result, Blackwater USA was awarded a contract by the U.S. Navy worth 
$35.7 million in early 2002 to train 30,000 sailors in force protection techniques.79  This 
contract catapulted Blackwater into the spotlight as one of the leaders in military training 
provided by private contractors. 
It was in this context that Blackwater Security Consulting (BSC) was formed on 
January 22, 2002.80  This subsidiary would, in a short period of time, raise the profile of 
its parent company, Blackwater USA, to new heights and propel it for the first time into 
the spotlight as the world’s leading PMC and security provider.  BSC would make its 
mark by providing force protection services to government agencies and installations 
worldwide and Personal Security Detachments (PSDs) to military and diplomatic 
missions.  Its first security contract was awarded in April 2002 by the CIA to provide 
twenty security guards to protect the CIA’s station in Kabul.81  With the award of this 
security contract to BSC, Blackwater USA had officially arrived and was now playing in 
the big leagues with the likes of companies such as MPRI, Dyncorp, and others. 
By early 2003, the company was uniquely poised to win even more security 
contracts.  They did not have to wait long for the opportunity; the catalyst for growth was 
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the U.S. invasion, and subsequent occupation of Iraq in March 2003.  By this time, the 
company had established its reputation as a professional provider of force protection and 
security services through successful performance on its previous contracts.  In August of 
2003, it secured its highest profile contract yet, the personal security detail of 
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer in post-invasion Iraq.82  In just 28 days, Blackwater was 
able to put together a security detail of 64 men, armored cars, and helicopters to provide 
24 hour protection to the man who had become the ultimate symbol of the U.S. 
occupation in Iraq.83  This security contract, and their performance, would seal 
Blackwater’s reputation as one of the most elite PMCs.  Blackwater was becoming the 
trendsetter in the modern PMI. 
Blackwater’s growth continued to accelerate from late 2003 to June 2004, when it 
was awarded the DoS Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract.84  This contract 
resulted in a massive increase in the number of personnel working for the company as 
independent contractors at numerous worldwide locations, and performing numerous 
security missions.   By the end of 2004, revenues had experienced a growth of over 600 
percent, and by 2007, there were over 1800 personnel working for Blackwater.85  At 
present, Blackwater USA and its subsidiaries have won more than $1 billion in federal 
contracts.86  So, one might ask, how does the company do it?  How has it organized for 
success?  The following section will attempt to answer those questions and shed some 
light on the present organization known as Blackwater USA. 
C. BLACKWATER’S ORDER OF BATTLE 
The functional organization of Blackwater USA is similar to that of many western 
militaries.  Blackwater USA is the holding company of nine subsidiary companies, each 
organized along functional lines based upon the tasks performed.  These functional areas 
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range from aviation and training to intelligence and logistics and are similar to the 
command and staff functions seen in typical western militaries.  These companies include 
Greystone, Ltd., Raven Construction, Aviation Worldwide, and Blackwater Security 
Consulting.  Blackwater USA is itself a subsidiary of The Prince Group, Erik Prince.87 
The composition of personnel that make up Blackwater’s independent contractor 
base are mostly U.S. citizens, but also consist of special forces professionals from the 
other militaries of the world.  This has caused discontent in the world community who 
views this aspect of the PMI dangerously close to mercenary-type activities.  
Blackwater’s personnel base is readily expansible as the company maintains a database of 
some 40,000 personnel on call, and available for duty, on relatively short notice.88 
The equipment that Blackwater uses includes some of the most sophisticated 
technologies in the world.  In addition to modern small arms and ammunition, 
Blackwater has a wide range of armored and unarmored platforms on which to conduct 
missions.  They have both strategic and tactical aviation assets, and depending on the 
mission, can provide fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft.  The company continues to 
expand its equipment offerings and is now fielding its own armored vehicle known as the 
Grizzly.  Additionally, it is developing a blimp-like aerial observation platform for use in 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.89  There is no doubt, by looking 
at the arsenal that the company owns as well as its database of personnel, that Blackwater 
USA is ready and capable to fill all of the U.S. government’s private security needs.  To 
reinforce the capabilities of the company, a Blackwater executive stated that it has the 
capability to field a brigade-sized military force.90 
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D. PUBLICITY AND CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING BLACKWATER 
Blackwater USA continued to expand and grow through late 2003 and early 2004 
by conducting a marketing campaign that capitalized on its reputation as the premiere 
private security provider in Iraq and Afghanistan.  This savvy public relations campaign 
sent a message to government decision makers that Blackwater was the premiere private 
security solution and had a reputation backed up with results, while simultaneously 
keeping a low profile in the international press.  Blackwater would not be widely known 
to the public and world opinion until the events of March 31, 2004.  On that date, a 
Blackwater security convoy of four contractors was brutally murdered in Fallujah.91  
Their bodies were mutilated and hung from a bridge, provoking an all out siege on the 
city of Fallujah by the U.S. military.  Several days later, Blackwater contractors were 
again in the news in Najaf as they helped to repel an assault by militia forces commanded 
by Muqtada al Sadr.92  These events would bring the company to the forefront of the 
public policy debate on Iraq. 
Over the course of the Iraq War, Blackwater has remained in the media spotlight.  
The most recent incident involving Blackwater contractors took place on September 16, 
2007 in Iraq.  Blackwater contractors are accused of killing 17 Iraqi civilians as their 
Blackwater convoy vacated a hostile square in Baghdad.93  The contractors insist that 
they were fired upon first, and were merely defending themselves.  In the weeks to 
follow, the incident generated even greater political tension, leading to the Iraqi 
government calling for expulsion of Blackwater from Iraq and the repeal of CPA Order 
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17.94  As referenced in Chapter III, this CPA order provides PMCs immunity from Iraqi 
law.  The culpability and result of these actions are not yet determined, but the F.B.I. has 
sent agents, at the request of the DoS, to investigate the incident in Iraq.95  Blackwater 
has resumed operations with an increase in DoS oversight until the findings by the F.B.I. 
are officially released.96  These events, at least from a public relations standpoint, 
brought Blackwater to the forefront of the PMI and have increased the debate over the 
use of armed contractors.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The PMI, as represented in this case study of Blackwater, is experiencing 
phenomenal growth and an increase in controversy as a result of the high profile incidents 
that have placed the company in the media spotlight.  Blackwater, the current trendsetter 
of the PMI, is a microcosm of the industry itself and represents the good, the bad, and the 
future of PMCs and armed contractors.  As the current public policy debate rages on, one 
thing is for certain: the first order of society is to be secure.  People will seek out security 
and protection from the means that are available.  If the public sector is not up to the task, 
the private sector will step up to provide the services. 
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V. CRITICAL ISSUES OF THE PRIVATE MILITARY 
INDUSTRY 
PMCs and their conduct are now out in the open, officially above the 
horizon of public awareness, although concerns about transparency, 
openness and regulatory oversight remain. – David Isenberg, 2004 97 
This chapter explores the critical issues that influence the decision by policy 
makers to utilize PMCs and armed contractors in support of U.S. military operations.  
The critical issues outlined in this chapter address a combination of government, military, 
and public concerns with the PMI.  Some of these are the issues that the government will 
need to overcome before expanding the authority of PMCs, and others directly influence 
the extent to which the U.S. government can consider privatization as a viable option.  
Moreover, these are the very same issues that will have an impact on the expanded use of 
armed contractors in combat operations.  Based on the trends outlined in the initial 
chapter (expansion of the PMI and reliance by the U.S. government on PMCs), it is 
foreseeable that roles of PMCs may expand to include armed contractors in support of 
U.S. sanctioned irregular warfare operations and low intensity conflicts.  This discussion 
of the issues will facilitate a better understanding of the implications and benefits of 
PMCs and assist in determining to what extent the U.S. government and the public are 
willing to accept armed contractors in U.S. military operations.  
The U.S. government has adopted PMCs as part of their total military force 
structure, and it does not appear that the current policy is going to allow them to deviate 
from this trend anytime soon.  If this trend, as outlined in previous chapters, is accepted 
as fact, then it is imperative that the public gains a better understanding of the PMI and its 
role in U.S. military operations.  Ultimately, the public’s grasp of these matters directly 
impacts the policy maker’s decision in regard to the use and potential expanded use of 
PMCs and armed contractors by the U.S. government.  The public needs to have an 
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understanding of how the military operates and why it has relied on PMCs to support 
military operations.  This understanding may or may not influence an opinion on this 
controversial issue of armed contractors, but it will shed light on the critical issues 
involved with utilizing PMCs in U.S. military operations. 
A. PUBLIC PERCEPTION 
Public perception is largely based on people’s opinion of whether or not an act or 
action is consistent with shared values, attitudes, and beliefs of society.  This 
determination also influences societies’ acceptable moral and ethical boundaries.  So in 
the case of PMCs supporting U.S. military operations, such as Blackwater, public 
perception of PMCs is determined by the public’s collective opinion on the degree to 
which the contractors’ actions are consistent with shared values of society.  These shared 
values are framed by the moral and ethical boundaries of society. 
It can be ascertained that public perception is strongly linked to legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public.  As in Figure 1, a simple model can illustrate the relationship between 
legitimacy and public perception.  Legitimacy and favorable public perception move 
along the same axis; as legitimacy increases, so does public perception. 
 
Figure 1.   Legitimacy / Perception Diagram 
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As with any government policy issue, PMCs are subject to the effects of public 
perception.  Perception can be used as an indicator to determine the degree of public 
support on a given issue and the extent to which the government will be able to pursue or 
abandon a particular policy decision.  Currently, the best that can be determined is that 
the PMI issue remains divided.  The extensive media coverage of the recent Blackwater 
debacle in Iraq, on September 16, 2007, is just the most recent incident involving a PMC.  
However, a decrease in public support for PMCs has been noted in media sources over 
the past year or so.  It is hard to determine whether this trend will continue or whether it 
represents a transitory phenomenon.  Critical incidents can sharply change public 
opinion.  For example, the opinion polls taken shortly after September 11, 2001 “found 
that only 11 percent of Americans opposed the idea of contracting private soldiers to hunt 
down terrorist leaders.”98 
 Undoubtedly, public perception can be shaped by the various media sources and 
the public understanding of the issues at hand.  As the media continually highlights the 
negative aspects of PMCs and portrays contractors, such as Blackwater, in a bad light, a 
growing cloud of negativity is likely to form, further diminishing public support for the 
PMI.  Supporters of the PMI continue to highlight the “positive functions that they 
[contractors] have performed,” but there are just as many critics that who are surfacing 
the industries’ shortcomings.99  PMCs must do a better job of opening up to the media 
and putting out their own story; silence on this issue will only lead to a decrease in public 
support. 
B. ESTABLISHING LEGITIMACY 
This section explores the factors that influence the legitimacy of the PMI and its 
link to public perception and opinion.  Public perception is a good indicator of  
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legitimacy, but legitimacy does not rest entirely on the shoulders of public perception.  
Legitimacy of the PMI can change with reform of the industry and some of these reforms 
are currently underway. 
From research and study on the PMI, Professor Nicholas Matziorinis from McGill 
Management in Montreal, Canada has set forth a framework to describe how the PMI has 
historically established legitimacy.  In his work, Matziorinis outlines the following four 
areas that have allowed PMCs to established legitimacy on both the state and 
international level.100   
• International Convention and Legislation 
• Relevant U.S. Military Doctrine 
• Industry References 
• Scope of International Legitimacy 
This framework also could be applicable for PMCs in the United States. 
1. International Convention and Legislation 
Professor Matziorinis identifies that there is a lack of international legislation 
prohibiting the use of PMCs.  International conventions and legislation define and discuss 
the use of mercenaries, but fail to address PMCs.  Specifically, the 1977 Additional 
Protocol 1 to Article 47 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the UN 
International Convention against the Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries (4 Dec 
1989) merely define the legal status of mercenaries within the context of international 
and humanitarian law.101  The international legislation is outdated and does not reflect 
the current use of PMCs by legitimate states.  As stated by Matziorinis, “The documents 
[referencing the previously identified documents] do not address the evolution of PMCs  
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and their application within modern conflict.”102  Beyond these documents, no recent 
international legislation exists or attempts to address the use and legal status of armed 
contractors. 
Professor Matziorinis identifies two reasons or issues for the lack of international 
legislation for PMCs; the first is the “extremely rapid evolution and growth of the PMI 
since the end of the Cold War,” and the second is the “indication that the international 
community is currently devoid of a serious commitment to regulate the expansion of 
military power beyond the application by nation-states’ armed forces.”103  Furthermore, 
and as defined in the initial chapter of this thesis, PMCs and mercenaries are not the 
same; the definitions typically referenced are not reflective of the current trends in 
military affairs.  PMCs see themselves as permanent structures that share the goals of the 
nation and will be around after the conflict, whereas the mercenary has no stake in the 
outcome of the conflict.104   
2. Relevant U.S. Military Doctrine 
PMCs or contractors – closest operational term in U.S. military doctrine since the 
term PMC is not recognized – operate under U.S. military doctrine as outlined in U.S. 
Army Regulation 715-9: Contractors Accompanying the Force.  This regulation does 
provide the doctrinal basis for contractors operating with the military, but does not begin 
to address the issue to the degree required to properly address the size and scope of PMCs 
in U.S. military operations. 
U.S. Army doctrine distinguishes contractors from combatants by the roles that 
they perform.  The regulation states that contractors can potentially perform any function 
on the battlefield except inherently governmental functions.105  Any involvement in these 
inherently governmental functions will negate their non-combatant status. 
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As applied to this work, the identification of relevant doctrine and acceptance of 
contractors by the DoD and DoS, does legitimize the concept of PMCs from the U.S. 
military’s perspective.  However, legitimization based on doctrine cannot be extended 
beyond the limits previously established since this doctrine does not apply to contractors 
operating beyond their current roles.  Additionally, the doctrine does not reflect the 
current scope of armed contractors or increased reliance on PMCs by the U.S. 
government.  It is also important to note that historically, the discussion of combatant and 
non-combatant status of armed contractors is only relevant to those legitimate states that 
recognize this distinction on the battlefield. 
3. Industry References 
As in the corporate world, the PMC is self-legitimized through accepted business 
practices and industry references.  In many ways, PMCs rely on their reputation and the 
image of the entire PMI as a source to legitimize their operations.  Professor Matziorinis 
identifies that PMCs throughout the industry have self-legitimized their operations by 
adherence to the following accepted business practices:106 
• PMCs are structured as privately owned and independent businesses 
• PMCs are nationally registered and incorporated businesses 
• The board of directors of PMCs is most commonly constituted from 
former serving senior armed forces leadership, specifically retired general 
rank appointments. 
• Broad parameters of contractual support and capability are detailed 
• A selected Corporate Overview is presented within a public domain that 
infers a form of universal scrutiny. 
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4. Scope of International Legitimacy 
International legitimacy is extended to the PMI based on the fact that they are 
contracted by and their work supports a legitimate state’s foreign policy.  This 
relationship is at the foundation of international acceptance and legitimacy of PMCs 
supporting U.S. government agencies abroad.  Furthermore, the actions of PMCs are 
under strict and continuous criticism from the international community.  Presently, “only 
the U.K. and U.S. national governments have reinforced this de-facto legitimacy by 
discrete but official sanctioning of their international contracts and operations.”107  PMCs 
gain international legitimacy by operating under the umbrella of U.S. military operations. 
C. ADHERENCE TO VALUES AND NORMS 
As the concept of PMCs gains legitimacy, a determination must be made on 
whether utilization of PMCs and armed contractors in expanded roles is consistent with 
the values and social norms of society.  A soldier, contractor, and mercenary share some 
commonalities, but distinct differences also exist among them, specifically in terms of 
influencing forces such as monetary incentives, adherence to the values of society, and 
loyalty to the nation.  Each of these elements is closely tied to one’s motivation to serve 
or work. 
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Figure 2.   Combined Legitimacy / Perception Diagram 
Figure 2 (hypotheses) illustrates the degree to which the influencing force shapes 
the three roles.  Although the exact location is difficult to determine, it is plausible to 
argue that a volunteer soldier leans more towards loyalty, and a mercenary more towards 
profit.  Contractors are likely to fall somewhere in between them on the influencing 
dimension.  Although further studies would need to be done to support this conjecture, it 
suggests that a soldier, contractor, and mercenary could be differentiated in terms of the 
motivating factors that influence individuals in these three different roles. 
One can argue, for example, that a soldier is driven by his loyalty to his nation; 
his actions are guided by his adherence to learned values and social norms.  In most 
cases, the values that guide actions are in line with the values of the nation.  The public’s 
trust in the U.S. military is suggestive of this relationship.  According to a Harris Poll in 
2006, the U.S. military ranks as one of most-trusted institutions in the U.S. 
government.108  The public’s trust in the military “stems from the perceived integrity and 
values of the soldiers within it and the spirit of selfless service embodied in their duty on 
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behalf of the country.”109  As Samuel Huntington wrote, “The military professional’s 
relation to society is guided by an awareness that his skill can only be utilized for 
purposes approved by society through its political agent, the state.”110 
At the other end of the spectrum, a mercenary, per se, is likely to be influenced by 
profits and salaries with minimal attachment to the conflict, and even less to the values or 
loyalty of the states involved, positions inconsistent with PMCs and those government 
forces directly supporting the legitimate military operations of their nation.  Contractors, 
on the other hand, are likely to fall in the middle between the incentive of high salaries 
and loyalty to the nation.  Even though contractors are getting paid more for their service, 
a high degree of servitude to one’s nation exits.  As stated by Erik Prince, founder, 
owner, and CEO of Blackwater USA, “I am an American working for America.”111 
D. PRINCIPAL – AGENT CONFLICTS 
The U.S. government has created a logical and lucrative business environment for 
PMCs; however, there is a conflict of interest in outsourcing inherently governmental 
functions.  Scholars argue that PMCs are motivated by profit, not national interest or 
advancement of U.S. policy.112  As profit-driven actors, they are expected to “make 
operational decisions that are influenced by their bottom lines.”113  Thus, the utilization 
of PMCs by the U.S. government, security and national affairs are less likely to be “about 
collective good, but more about private means and ends.”114  The profit motive appears 
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to be in direct opposition to the traditional values of the nation.  Like most other contracts 
in the private sector, private military contracts consist of one person paying for the 
service and one doing the job.  With this relationship, it is assumed that the interests of 
the U.S. government and PMCs “will never exactly coincide so there will always be an 
element of divided loyalties and goals.”115 
This inconsistency in goals between the public and private sectors can best be 
described using agency theory.116  This theory addresses the fundamental problems in 
principal-agent relationships, such as the relationship between the U.S. government 
(principal) and PMCs (agent).  The principal-agent relationship with PMCs causes unique 
challenges for the U.S. government.  Problems arise when the “goals of the principal and 
agent conflict” and when it is “difficult for the principal to verify what the agent is 
actually doing.”117  These problems can be reduced by using appropriate contracting 
methods and increasing the amount of oversight on the actions of the agent.118 
In agency theory, the principal focuses on determining whether a behavior-based 
contract or an outcome-based contract for the agent is most appropriate to reduce the 
inconsistencies and conflicts that exist in a principal-agent relationship.119  The purpose 
of the contract is to ensure the agent is operating within the boundaries established by the 
principal.  The most appropriate and effective type of contract arrangement realigns the 
goals of the agent with the principal’s goals.  For example, in a situation when outcomes 
are easily measured, an outcome-based contract is more appropriate, but as the outcomes 
                                                 
115 Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), 151. 
116 Kathleen Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” The Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 14, no. 1, January 1989 [article online]; available from 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0363-
7425%28198901%2914%3A1%3C57%3AATAAAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P; Internet; accessed 8 December 
2007. 
117 Kathleen Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” The Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 14, no. 1, January 1989 [article online]; available from 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0363-





become more difficult to measure, a behavior-based contract is more desirable. The 
amount of information available to oversee the agent’s activities plays an important role 
in determining the most appropriate contract method to govern this relationship. As stated 
by Kathleen Eisenhardt, one of the foremost experts in management and administrative 
theory, “The heart of principal-agent theory is the trade-off between the cost of 
measuring behavior and the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the 
agent.”120 
In the case of PMCs, such as Blackwater in Iraq, outcome-based contracts initially 
made more sense because they sufficiently aligned the preferences or goals of the agent 
with the principal.  The U.S. government needed armed contractors to provide security 
for key individuals, and PMCs were contracted to provide these services.  These 
outcome-based contracts were appropriate when the outcome was easily measured merely 
in terms of mission accomplishment.  But, as the situation becomes more certain and 
information is more readily available, behavior-based contracts appear to be more 
appropriate.121  Behavior-based contracts require the government to invest resources in 
information systems to monitor and control the activities of PMCs.  Examples of 
information systems include an increase of contracting officials, embedded personnel, 
control measures, and coordination mechanisms.  A transition to behavior-based contracts 
and an increase in information systems will assist the government in ensuring that PMCs 
activities and goals are consistent with those of the U.S. government and military.   
The conflict that exists between the principal and agent is an important issue that 
has to be addressed and resolved.  Contract selection and management based on agency 
theory will assist the government in controlling the actions of PMCs and aligning their 
goals.  The government needs to make every effort to emplace the systems that will 
properly control the actions of PMCs and reduce the potential negative effects of the 
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principal-agent relationship.  Just because PMCs can fill the demand does not mean that 
the goals of the principal and agent are congruent.  The relationship must be analyzed 
further to ensure that the proper mechanisms are in place to produce the best possible 
arrangement for the U.S. government and PMCs.  To move beyond this conflict, PMCs 
will have to prove over time that their actions are consistent with the goals of the 
government and within the moral and ethical limits of the United States. 
E. U.S. POLICY CONCERNS 
With this integration of PMCs in military operations, the government is 
outsourcing the affairs of the state to a private corporation.  The government will need to 
examine the extent to which they will continue to use and rely on PMCs to conduct the 
affairs of the state.  The “use of privatized military actor as a foreign policy tool” may not 
be in the best interest of the government, and cost effectiveness may not be the correct 
basis for these matters.122  Government affairs, foreign policy, and military operations are 
more than just “achieving greater cost competitiveness.”123 
Foreign policy is a set of goals that seeks to outline how that particular country 
will interact with other countries of the world, and to a lesser extent, non-state actors.124  
The policy of the nation is linked to public opinion, values, and historical and legal 
precedent.125  With the acceptance and extensive use of PMCs, executing foreign policy 
has become as much a function of the private sector as it was a function of the public 
sector.  No longer is it presumed that foreign policy remains a function of the state.126  
According to Singer, PMCs and armed contractors are “private actors operating in the 
public realm of warfare.”127 
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In executing policy and strategy, government agencies have to continually assess 
available resources and requirements.  As outlined in the Blackwater case study, PMCs 
are providing a service, and an increase in requirements has forced the government to use 
them.  Foreign policy decisions have created the market demand for PMCs.  Other than 
expansion of the military or a reduction in requirements, the private sector is likely to 
continue to provide critical resources to the U.S. government.  If there was no desire to 
use PMCs or a demand did not exist for them, then the PMI would not have expanded to 
the extent that it has.  Currently, utilizing PMCs to fill policy requirements is viewed as a 
valid means to implement policy.128   
The PMC concept makes perfect business sense; it has worth and value, however, 
the U.S. government needs to proceed with caution.  As referenced in the previous 
section, PMCs will always have divided loyalties and goals based on the principal-agent 
conflict.  From the principal-agent perspective, it needs to be prudent in its use of PMCs.  
If the U.S. government chooses to utilize PMCs, then it will have to emplace multiple 
layers of control measures and coordination mechanisms to ensure that PMCs are 
carrying out their duties in an acceptable manner and congruent with the goals of the 
nation. 
F. IMPACT OF MESSAGES 
With the increased utilization of PMCs, the U.S. government has to consider the 
impact of the message that the trend of utilizing PMCs is sending.  For every action or 
decision, there is a perceived or actual message that is being sent along with that given 
action.129  The message may or may not have a negative impact, but nevertheless, the 
U.S. government has to consider this critical aspect of outsourcing inherently 
governmental functions.  The U.S. government will have to reinforce to the international 
community that the expanded use of PMCs does not equate to a lack of commitment by 
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the U.S. government.130  In addition, the host or supported nation may develop a sense of 
animosity towards the United States for using contracted personnel to conduct affairs of 
the nation, such as the Iraqi government’s demand for Blackwater employees to leave 
Iraq. 
The U.S. government has to consider all aspects of the message that it is sending 
when utilizing PMCs to support military operations.  The actions of PMCs and armed 
contractors will directly shape the larger message that the U.S. government is trying to 
send.  In Iraq, the U.S. military’s overall goal is to secure the population to give the Iraqi 
government time to evolve, but heavy-handed operations with aggressive tactics by 
armed contractors degrade this goal.131  For example, the recent Blackwater incident on 
September 16, 2007, where their employees have been accused of shooting 17 innocent 
Iraqi citizens supports this issue.  The government must reinforce with PMCs that all 
actions have messages and psychological impacts.132  If the message that is being sent is 
inconsistent with the desired intent, then the U.S. government must emplace controls to 
counter the effects of PMCs or ensure their actions are consistent with the overall goals 
of the operation through effective management of the contract. 
Another concern is the adoption of outsourcing by other nations; if this practice is 
viewed on the international scene as acceptable for the U.S. government, then it becomes 
acceptable for other states to do the same.  In addition, a negative perception or opinion 
may develop from the perception that PMCs are making money on others’ problems.  
The U.S. government needs to carefully consider the impacts of their actions and the 
policy to use PMCs in support of U.S. military operations. 
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G. ACCOUNTABILITY 
From a normative standpoint, one major area of concern lies in the accountability 
of armed contractors and their ability to effectively operate within the legal boundaries of 
the law.  According to Professor Matziorinis, “A PMC is structured solely for 
commercial profit and is not bound by the codes, rules, and regulations that make a 
nation’s armed forces unique and accountable.”133  To further complicate the issue of 
accountability, a distinct separation of responsibility currently exists between U.S. 
government agencies and the PMCs.  This separation has adversely affected control and 
accountability.  PMCs fulfill their contractual requirements, but basically operate on their 
own discretion and are not held accountable for their actions.  Clearly, these are issues 
that have resulted from an improper principal-agent relationship between the U.S. 
government and PMCs. 
Accountability is closely tied to regulation and control.  The main indicator that 
there is a lack of regulation over the PMI is that contractors have not been held 
accountable for inappropriate actions on the battlefield.  As in the case when a 
Blackwater employee, who was drunk inside the Green Zone in Baghdad, shot and killed 
a guard of the Iraqi vice president on Christmas Eve 2006.134  No criminal actions were 
filed; the Blackwater employee was merely fired.  This is just one example of many that 
reinforce the negative notion that PMCs operate in the grey area of law.  So, it remains to 
be determined whether contractors will be held to the laws of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice or public law.   In this vacuum of regulation and oversight, the possibility 
of “legal recourse” against PMCs remains unlikely.135 
PMCs are operating in a grey area, not under the direct control by their 
contracting agency and surely not under control by the DoD.  Government agencies have 
demonstrated an inability to retain control of those PMCs supporting and operating 
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within their own agency.136  A paradigm exists: government agencies contract the 
services of PMCs because they are undermanned and unable to resource critical 
requirements, but the undermanned agencies will also lack the proper resources to 
provide oversight and control of contractors operating within their agency.  The identified 
lack of regulation and control leads to lack of accountability. 
PMCs are a resource provider, and the government needs to ensure that PMCs and 
contractors are held accountable for their actions by removing any grey area ambiguity 
that exists in the laws that govern the actions of PMCs.  Government agencies need to 
ensure that PMCs operate within the limits of their contract and conduct their business in 
an appropriate manner by properly addressing the principal-agent conflict through 
effective contract management.  As PMCs take on additional roles in U.S. military 
operations, it would be beneficial if control of armed contractors could fall under a single 
entity, the DoD or DoS (as dictated by the scope of the contract).  In October 2007 
shortly after the Blackwater incident in Iraq, it was noted that Secretary of Defense Gates 
desired armed security contractors to fall under a single authority, specifically DoD.137 
Both the government agency and the PMC have a lot at stake and share a desire to 
hold its personnel accountable for their actions (policy and performance).  The argument 
within the PMI is that “any firm that acts in an unaccountable or reckless manner would 
hurt its long-term financial interests and thus would automatically choose against such 
action.”138  As stated by Erik Prince (Blackwater USA), “If the guys did anything wrong, 
they’ll be held accountable.”139  Contractors are paid a significant amount and should be 
held to a high standard.  Accountability, if appropriately designated, could make the costs 
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so high on the PMCs and armed contractors that if they are legally found to have acted 
inappropriately or outside their contractual limits, they would face punishment under the 
UCMJ system. 
H. REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT 
PMCs have operated in the realm of unknown for many years, but recent media 
coverage of Blackwater in Iraq has heightened the awareness of the public.  Due to this 
increased awareness of PMC activities, the PMI is at the forefront of topics on Capitol 
Hill.140  Regulation is currently under intense scrutiny, and the PMI is being closely 
examined by the legislative and judiciary branches of our government.141  Many 
politicians are urging for an increase in regulation and proper oversight.142   
As a result of the Blackwater incident on September 16, 2007, the requirements 
on PMCs operating in Iraq have increased.  The additional requirements were outlined in 
an agreement made between senior officials in the DoD and DoS.  This agreement placed 
an emphasis on coordination and oversight.  According to the Pentagon’s press secretary, 
Geoff Morrell, “It [the agreement] will help ensure that all personal security contractors 
are operating in a manner that is consistent with our mission to secure Iraq by winning 
the trust and confidence of its people.”143  This agreement is only the initial step in a 
broader attempt by the government to regulate the activities of PMCs that support U.S. 
military operations. 
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The U.S. government has to do a better job of regulating the PMI if it intends to 
continue the trend of privatization of military functions.  The legal institutions of our 
government need to improve the regulation on PMCs by removing the legal ambiguity 
and emplace the proper laws to govern the actions of PMCs and armed contractors that 
operate in support of U.S. military operations.  At a minimum, regulating the PMI will 
include the establishment of clear lines of control, accountability, and laws that govern 
the actions of PMCs.  PMCs need to be held accountable for inappropriate actions under 
a revised legal framework that resides in U.S. military law (UCMJ).  PMCs cannot 
remain and exist in the grey area between military and public law.  A revised legal 
framework is discussed in Chapter VII.  
I. EFFECTS ON THE MILITARY 
Along with previously identified effects in the public sector, expansion of PMCs 
are likely to have effects on the military.  PMCs may negatively impact operations, and 
the military may develop an unintentional reliance on PMCs.  This reliance may also spill 
over and affect the retention of highly skilled personnel in the military.  Over-reliance on 
PMCs may degrade the capabilities of the uniformed military.  The military must not 
become dependant on PMCs and lose the ability to conduct certain types of missions.  
Once a requirement is handed over to PMCs, it will be difficult for the military to 
immediately regain lost capabilities, especially as it is conceivable that PMCs would seek 
to protect their portion of the market.  An example of a potential lost capability is in the 
realm of armed personal security.  Armed security is one area that the government has 
outsourced extensively in Iraq to PMCs such as Blackwater. 
With respect to training and manning, the military has to be wary of drift in the 
roles that PMCs perform.  As contractors become proficient in one area, they will seek to 
become proficient in other areas.  The military must always remember that PMCs are 
profit-driven entities; it is in a PMCs best interest to assume new roles and maximize 
profit.  It will be incumbent upon the military to determine which skill sets are important 
for it to retain and which could be absorbed by PMCs.  The skill sets of special operations 
forces, for example, are an important investment by the government and take a long time 
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to develop.  How would the military protect this skill set and ensure that it does not 
become the training ground for the PMI?  It may, for example, need to refine the 
incentive structure to target and retain the highly skilled individuals that PMCs desire.   
 It is conceivable that there will be pushback from the uniformed military when 
integrating PMCs in U.S. military operations.  One can assume that the U.S. military, like 
any bureaucracy, will resist change.144  If change is pursued, all efforts will be needed to 
coordinate the force at all levels, especially to minimize the principal-agent problems.  
The government will also have to consider what balance it wishes to maintain between 
uniformed personnel and contractors.  The right mix and total number of contractors may 
be situation-dependent, in order to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the force.  
The determination of the right mix between uniformed and armed contractors is identified 
as a potential area for further exploration. 
J. BENEFITS OF OUTSOURCING 
Despite the concerns that arise from utilization of PMCs and armed contractors by 
the U.S. government in military operations, contracting does provide some benefits to 
those agencies.  The majority of the benefits are focused around the usefulness of PMCs 
and the flexibility that contracting provides.  The U.S. military is operating in a period 
where the policy requirements outweigh the available military resources.145  As 
previously identified, this gap in resources is one of the main reasons that contracting has 
moved to the forefront as a viable option.  The contracting process does provide 
operational flexibility to the government.  This flexibility allows government agencies to 
simply contract PMCs to fill those areas of deficiency.  Under the contracting process, 
highly skilled contractors are easily obtained for a specific mission and set amount of 
time (this reinforces the aspects of surge).  This ease of filling requirements and  
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augmenting to reduce demands on the force clearly identifies the reason that outsourcing 
has grown to the extent it has, but this benefit also has to be weighed against all other 
critical issues. 
Contracting PMCs does bring highly trained and specialized personnel back to the 
operation when their services are called upon.  They provide specific skill sets for 
specific requirements and missions.  PMCs and the contracting process have established 
their worth and value to the U.S. government.  As U.S. military spokesman Rear Admiral 
Fox recently stated, “Quite frankly, the presence of a number of these people 
[contractors] here in Iraq are essential to a lot of our operations.”146  Contracting PMCs 
to fill requirements and force gaps can blend of efficiency (ease of use) and effectiveness 
(gets the job done).  However, in the case of PMCs supporting U.S. military operations, it 
has yet to be determined whether the efficiency and effectiveness aspects of contracting 
are more linked to profit and tangible incentives than the call to duty.  From the principal-
agent perspective, this conflict is a significant issue for the U.S. government.   
The U.S. government has become accustomed to utilizing PMCs, but has also 
found itself in a precarious position with a developed reliance on their use.  PMCs are 
now essential, on many levels, to the successful execution of most DoD and DoS 
operations.  Under current policy, the U.S. government needs PMCs and armed 
contractors to support military operations, but the underlying issues related to the use of 
their services as outlined in this chapter raise considerable concern. 
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VI. BUILDING FRAMEWORKS FOR PRIVATE MILITARY 
COMPANIES 
The central issue thus is about values-about how to mesh often different 
public and private values into a smoothly functioning system and how to 
achieve this result without sacrificing the public interest. – Donald Kettl 
147 
The previous chapter discussed the critical issues involved in the use of private 
military force as a means to accomplish public policy ends.  The identification of these 
critical issues is a necessary first step before decisions regarding the expanded use of 
private military force can be undertaken by government policy makers. This chapter 
intends to explore further the ambiguous nature of the legal and contracting frameworks 
used prior to the Defense Authorization Act of 2007 and to examine how PMCs 
integrated or failed to integrate into those frameworks.  It further examines how these 
frameworks need to be adapted in order for the U.S. government to consider using PMCs 
in expanded roles to achieve public policy ends.  The need for the U.S. government to 
establish clear and transparent frameworks within which PMCs can operate is necessary 
if they are to achieve public policy ends in a manner that is perceived to be legitimate.  
The chapter concludes by discussing the need to fully integrate PMCs into the 
government’s policy framework in order to achieve optimal foreign policy outputs. 
A. LEGAL JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORKS 
The existence and legitimacy of the PMI is well grounded in historical and legal 
precedent.  Indeed, the employment of private military forces by the United States has 
played a major role in the shaping of its national history.  The legal basis and continuing 
precedent for the use of private military force in support of national objectives during 
wartime can be found in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution which grants 
Congress the power to “To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make 
rules concerning captures on land and water.”  Contractors have gone to war in support of 
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U.S. military forces since the beginning of the republic and the “United States has a long 
history of applying military law to contractor organizations and personnel.”148  Why then 
is there so much ambiguity and confusion with regards to the legal status of PMCs?  Why 
has the current legal framework failed to regulate the PMI by enforcing existing laws and 
regulations? 
The answer lies in the interpretation of U.S. law regarding military contractors 
accompanying U.S. military forces.   According to Lindemann, the Articles of War, the 
military legal framework used prior to 1950, addressed private military contractors 
accompanying U.S. military forces and subjected them to military law only during times 
of war.149  When the Uniform Code of Military Justice became law in 1950, this was 
amended to include periods when no formal war had been declared; “persons serving 
with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States” fell 
under UCMJ jurisdiction.150  However, this clarification proved short-lived and over the 
next two decades, U.S. courts “eviscerated the portions of the UCMJ that ostensibly 
applied to contractors working for the armed forces.”151  At the heart of the issue was the 
constitutionality of extending court-martial jurisdiction over civilians in peacetime, 
without a formal declaration of war by Congress.  This rejection of that portion of the 
UCMJ by the federal courts meant in practical terms that the legal status of contractors 
would be ambiguous in combat zones outside of U.S. territory.  Contractors would not 
fall under the U.S. criminal code (domestic or UCMJ), nor under the host nation’s laws 
because they were supporting U.S. military operations.  
This meant that “contractors fell into a legal limbo in which their behavior went 
largely unregulated.”152  Motivated by reports of contractor involvement in illicit 
activities in Bosnia in the late 1990s, Congress moved to clarify the ambiguous legal 
status of contractors serving U.S. foreign policy interests overseas by passing the Military 
                                                 






Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) in 2000.153  This law attempted to extend the 
jurisdiction of the domestic legal framework to U.S. citizens serving overseas with the 
DoD.  However, implementation proved difficult because of continuing ambiguity 
regarding contractors who worked overseas supporting federal agencies other than the 
DoD.  In reality, MEJA did little to ensure the enforcement of the law because it 
separated the legal jurisdiction and the legal enforcement mechanisms between different 
federal agencies.  Hence, even though the DoD might have been the federal agency best 
positioned to enforce the law in a particular country, the Department of Justice was 
tasked to do so because domestic criminal law, under which contractors fell, was in its 
jurisdiction.  This problem appears to have finally been resolved with the recent passage 
of the 2007 Defense Authorization Act.154  This act clarifies the application of the UCMJ 
and expands its jurisdiction to civilian contractors “in times of declared war or 
contingency operation,” effectively granting both jurisdiction and enforcement 
responsibilities to the U.S. military (DoD).155   
Now that the legal status of contractors has been clarified and a new jurisdictional 
framework has been established, it is the responsibility of the DoD to create an 
implementation framework for enforcing the UCMJ as it applies to PMCs.  The best way 
to enforce the UCMJ as a means of regulating contractor behavior is “to define the limits 
of the UCMJ’s jurisdiction, in terms of personnel, substance, and enforcement authority” 
through a new contracting framework and DoD regulation specifically written to address 
PMCs supporting U.S. military operations.156  The next section will discuss what needs 
to happen in the context of the contracting framework so that the U.S. government can 
align contractor behavior and accountability within the context of the UCMJ.  In doing 
so, the current legal ambiguities and ethical controversies surrounding companies such as 
the case of Blackwater may fade into the background as the grey areas are reduced and 
PMCs are held accountable for their actions under U.S. military law.  
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B. CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
With the enactment of the 2007 Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. Congress has 
defined the legal framework that clarifies the legal status of contractors on the battlefield 
and further assigns jurisdictional and enforcement responsibilities to a single government 
agency, the DoD.  Now that this has been done, the question becomes one of 
implementation.  How will the DoD enforce the law and provide accountability and 
control of all PMCs supporting U.S. military operations?  The answer to this question is 
especially relevant in light of recent talk about expanded roles for PMCs, possibly 
including combat in irregular warfare operations or low intensity conflicts.  Before these 
expanded roles can even be considered a new contracting framework for public-private 
partnership in the use of force is needed.  Conceptualizing and then implementing this 
new contracting framework will result in expanded control and accountability of PMCs 
and armed contractors.  This is a necessary and logical next step in the process to better 
regulate PMCs by the U.S. government. 
Aside from implementing the new legal framework and clarifying contractor legal 
status under the UCMJ, adjusting the contracting framework is the most important 
change that would enable the U.S. government to increase PMC oversight and 
accountability.  In agency theory, the contract is the primary control mechanism.  As 
identified in the section on principal-agent conflicts in Chapter VI, the contract attempts 
to define the relationship between the principal and the agent in order to resolve the 
agency problem to both parties satisfaction.157  Under the previous contracting 
framework, the military “attempted to formulate a coherent doctrine governing contractor 
oversight,” however, these attempts fell short of effectively providing adequate doctrine 
to guide the actions of PMCs.158  Hence, the contract management framework itself was  
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lacking in control mechanisms meant to solve the agency problem.  This manifested itself 
in military contracting doctrine and operations that “continues to be, accomplished 
through a rather convoluted system.”159 
In order to fix this convoluted system, the government needs to consider contracts 
that are behavior-based as opposed to outcome-based in conflict areas such as Iraq.  The 
reason for this is that environmental uncertainties and risks appear to be subsiding as the 
U.S. military presence lengthens.  Additionally, information systems have become more 
established and the government is better able to monitor its contracted agents.  In 2003, 
this was not the case and the award of outcome-based contracts by various federal 
agencies was probably appropriate because of the uncertain operating environment and 
lack of information in which PMCs were then operating. These outcome-based contracts 
aligned the organizational goals of the government agencies and their agents but didn’t 
necessarily align with the overall strategic goals of the United States.  An example of this 
would be the Blackwater case study mentioned earlier.  Blackwater’s goal, to provide 
security to its principals, aligned well with the goals of the principals it was contracted to 
protect.  However, the goal of securing the principal at the agency level by any means 
necessary detracted from the overall U.S. strategic and foreign policy goal of protecting 
the Iraqi population and securing Iraq.  By moving back towards a behavior- based 
contracting framework, the U.S. government will potentially have the necessary 
information systems to “curb agent opportunism because the agent will realize that he or 
she cannot deceive the principal.”160  The U.S. government already appears to be moving 
in this direction.  The DoS, for instance, recently announced that it would be installing 
video cameras in all security contractor vehicles and would be assigning Diplomatic 
Security Officers to security convoys in an effort to improve oversight.161 
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A new contracting framework utilizing behavior-based contracts needs to 
specifically address the two primary sub-components of that framework.  The first 
component is the principal in the form of the U.S. government and its acquisitions 
personnel.  The second component is the agent in the form of the PMCs and their 
contractors.  Both need to have a written roadmap consisting of approved doctrine that 
implements the legal framework noted above as well as a clear understanding of the 
contract.  On the principal side of the house, the U.S. government, according to 
Lindemann, needs “to classify offenses under the UCMJ into felony and non-felony 
categories.”162  Ultimately, the military should undertake a revision of its contractor-
related doctrine, distinguishing between different types of offenses and clearly stating the 
offenses for which contractors (civilians) supporting U.S. military operations may face 
prosecution under the UCMJ.  It will also be important to include a description of these 
offenses within the military contracts to ensure that the civilians involved understand the 
extent of their exposure to the UCMJ.163 
On the agent side of the house, PMCs need to ensure that their employees are 
fully trained on the laws of war and rules of engagement (ROE) and understand the law 
under the UCMJ.  In addition to this, they need to be well versed on the specifics of the 
written contract itself.  In order to ensure that this training and education occurs, the 
government should establish a certification process with scenario-based testing for both 
the individual contractors and contractor leadership. 
Once this new contracting framework is established, it is critical that the contract 
is aggressively managed by the U.S. government (principal).  A new system of contract 
management needs to be put in place that gives the contracting officer’s representative 
(COR) expanded oversight and UCMJ authority.  This may necessitate the establishment 
of additional acquisition personnel billets and systems to oversee an increasing number of 
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contracts, but moves have already been made in this direction with the Army recently 
announcing that it will expand its contracting staff by 1,400 personnel.164 
 
Figure 3.   Contract Management and Oversight Diagram 
For proper management of the contract, acquisitions and agency personnel need to 
be forward deployed and embedded with PMCs.  These personnel will provide the 
necessary oversight and accountability of PMCs in the conflict area.  The contract 
management and government agency personnel will form a cell and be integrated into the 
revised contractual framework.  A suggested organizational structure for the oversight 
cell, as depicted in Figure 3, consists of a contracting officer’s representative, legal 
advisor, and embedded government agency personnel.  This type of cell would be best 
suited to regulate the activities of PMCs by incorporating the legal and agency specific 
oversight mechanisms on PMCs. 
By implementing a revised contracting framework, the expanded use of PMCs in 
combat operations would have a better chance of success; the negative aspects of 
contracting are likely to be mitigated while the positive aspects could be maximized.  
Under these conditions, the legitimacy and use of private military forces could be kept 
                                                 
164 Colorado Springs Gazette, “Army Contracting Staff to Grow by 1,400,” Colorado Springs Gazette, 
7 December 2007, national edition, sec. A20. 
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within, and only within, this framework and under strict control.  What this means is that 
PMCs would operate only with the consent of the U.S. government and its agencies, and 
legitimacy would flow only from the government to the PMC.  However, these revised 
frameworks need to be balanced and kept from sacrificing the unique operational 
capabilities and advantages brought to the table by PMCs.  The costs of regulation and 
oversight will likely be high for the government, but the risks involved for the 
government without them are likely to be even higher. 
C. PRIVATE FORCE INTEGRATION INTO PUBLIC FORCE STRUCTURE 
The integration of PMCs within the government’s framework, the next logical 
step in the use of private force as a means to public ends, can only occur when the legal 
and contracting frameworks discussed above have been revised to provide clarity of 
duties and responsibilities for both the principal and agent.  The extent to which the U.S. 
government could integrate PMCs into U.S. military operations is divided into two 
distinct aspects.  One aspect is based on the limits and capabilities of PMCs, and the other 
is based on the willingness of public and government to expand the authority of PMCs.   
The expanded roles that PMCs and armed contractors could perform are 
widespread, only limited by the decision and authority to do so.  PMCs have 
demonstrated a willingness to expand and meet the demand, therefore from the PMCs 
perspective, the extent to which PMCs and armed contractors can be utilized is purely 
determined by the U.S. government.  In a decision to expand the roles, the U.S. 
government needs to determine the optimum balance between uniformed soldiers and 
armed contractors.  The optimum balance would retain critical capabilities within the 
military, but also maximize benefits of contracted personnel.  According to Singer, “At 
the end of the day, it’s really about fundamental choices that the nation needs to make: 
What aspects of your national security do you keep within the control of your 
government?”165  As previously discussed, revised frameworks with proper oversight 
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would increase the legitimacy of PMCs in the eyes of the American public and 
international community.  This increase in legitimacy would enable the U.S. government 
to utilize PMCs in expanded roles, potentially combat. 
One would assume that PMCs are likely to focus on providing services in 
specialized areas that require extensive training, such as the technical, high risk areas of 
security, intelligence, and irregular warfare operations.  These areas in the privatized 
military market maximize the capabilities of highly skilled contractors – most are former 
special forces operators – and have the most lucrative contracts with the largest profit 
margins.  PMCs are profit-driven organizations, and this fact will always be a component 
of their decision matrix, so the government must also consider this aspect when calling 
on PMCs. 
There is no indication that there is a deviation from national interests and policy 
by using PMCs, but to preserve goal congruence, contractors should never operate 
independent from governmental supervision and oversight.  Responsibility to policy 
adherence and accountability is directly tied back to the specifics of the contract and the 
ability of the U.S. government agencies to manage the contract.  Effective management 
of the contracts and an increase of control measures would go a long way in ensuring that 
the PMCs are fulfilling the work in an appropriate and acceptable manner. 
As previously discussed, the U.S. government recently took steps to ensure that 
the rules (ROE), codes (UCMJ), and regulations (policy and doctrine) for PMCs are 
similar to those that govern the actions of DoD personnel operating in combat zones.  
However, the legal framework that PMCs operate under is still ambiguous and does not 
hold them accountable for their actions.  Reform of these areas will not only increase the 
accountability, but also cohesion of the uniformed and private military forces.  The 
regulatory process should move swiftly to build the legal and contractual frameworks that 
reside over PMCs and hold contractors accountable for their actions.  Only by building 
the legal and contractual frameworks, integrating PMCs into the command structure, and 
constantly assessing and reassessing the contracts can the utilization of PMCs in U.S. 
military operations be accepted as a valid means by the U.S. government. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF WORK 
The introductory chapter framed the thesis by providing the purpose and scope of 
the work.  Supporting research questions, assumptions, and trends (expansion of PMI and 
reliance on PMCs by the U.S. government) were identified.  The research question that 
guided this work is the following: To what extent has the government considered 
privatization as a viable option to satisfy the force requirements of U.S. sanctioned 
irregular warfare operations and low intensity conflicts? 
The second chapter outlined the historical and legal precedent of privatization, 
and identified several world events that fueled the re-emergence of the PMI in the 
modern era.  U.S. foreign policy decisions are expanding the PMI, but also influencing 
the degree to which the U.S. government is likely to rely on their services.  The 
increasing role of PMCs in national security and military operations is expected to 
continue in the foreseeable future. 
The third chapter provided a current snapshot of the PMI by taking a closer look 
at the roles of PMCs and trends in contracting.  The numbers of PMCs and armed 
contractors supporting U.S. military operations clearly indicate reliance by the U.S. 
government on their services.  There is an ambiguous legal framework; PMCs operate 
under an immunity umbrella that is provided by the U.S. government and Coalition 
Provisional Authority Order 17.    
The fourth chapter presented a case study of Blackwater USA.  Blackwater 
epitomizes the PMI and follows the previously identified trend of expansion and growth.  
The actions of Blackwater and its employees have been continually scrutinized in the 
U.S. media. 
The fifth chapter explored the critical issues that would influence a decision by 
policy makers to utilize PMCs and armed contractors in support of U.S. military 
operations.  This analysis addressed a combination of government, military, and public 
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concerns with the PMI.  The U.S. government needs to carefully consider these issues 
before expanding the use of PMCs and armed contractors in U.S. military operations. 
The sixth chapter outlined the frameworks that would allow PMCs to effectively 
integrate in U.S. military operations.  These legal and contractual frameworks need to be 
revised in order for PMCs in expanded roles to be considered a viable option by the U.S. 
government.  The roles that PMCs and armed contractors could perform are widespread 
and only limited by the authority given to them by the U.S. government.  The PMI has 
clearly demonstrated a willingness to expand and meet the demand, therefore the extent 
to which PMCs can be utilized is purely determined by the U.S. government.   
B. FURTHER EXPLORATION AND POTENTIAL TOPICS 
Further exploration is needed in many of the areas that were presented in this 
thesis.  Some of these areas are potential thesis topics on their own, and others could be 
expanded upon with additional research.  This section suggests those areas and potential 
thesis topics. 
Analysis and additional research on the critical issues identified in this thesis 
would benefit those interested in determining actual and perceived impact of PMCs on 
U.S. military operations. 
As identified in this thesis, the trends of PMI expansion and reliance on PMCs by 
the U.S. government are a direct result of foreign policy decisions and inadequate 
resources in the public sector. The U.S. government has turned to the private sector – 
since other options are politically less feasible – since it is unable to fill the requirements 
of its adopted foreign policy.  Under this argument, research on the use of PMCs, as 
opposed to increasing the numbers of active duty soldiers, would provide clarity to the 
extent to which the government can and should continue to consider privatization as a 
viable option. 
Lastly, further exploration and research to identify the most useful roles that 
PMCs could fill within the U.S. government and military would be worthwhile.  
Additionally, the degree to which PMCs perform the identified roles should be based on 
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supporting analysis of which roles and functions the government should retain, so as not 
to lose any critical capabilities to the private sector.  This research would assist in 
determining the right mix of private and public forces to maximize efficiency and 
effectiveness (performance) of the total force. 
C. FINAL COMMENTS 
In an era of expanding foreign policy commitments, the government will be 
forced to either expand its stretched public military forces or to lessen its commitments.  
It appears unlikely that U.S. foreign policy commitments will decrease in the coming 
years, and support for the former choice does not exist.  Therefore, the logical and most 
likely alternative is to contract with a new type of volunteer; PMCs and armed 
contractors obviate the need for a draft. 
The U.S. government must carefully consider the issues involved with the use of 
PMCs in military operations and take appropriate measures to control their actions.  The 
legal and contractual challenges that the principal-agent relationship creates are 
significant.  The U.S. government must address and consider these aspects of 
privatization when utilizing PMCs.  It appears that PMCs are ready to make the transition 
to the next level of participation in U.S. military operations.  This expansion of PMC 
roles may be a natural progression in privatization of military functions in support of 
legitimate governments.  Ultimately, history will have the final say, but the use and 
expansion of the PMI may be viewed as the next revolution in military affairs of our 
generation. 
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